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Abstract
The use of game theory in the design and control of large scale networked
systems is becoming increasingly more important. In this paper, we follow this
approach to efficiently solve a network allocation problem motivated by peer-to-
peer cloud storage models as alternatives to classical centralized cloud storage
services. To this aim, we propose an allocation algorithm that allows the units
to use their neighbors to store a back up of their data. We prove convergence,
characterize the final allocation, and corroborate our analysis with extensive
numerical simulation that shows the good performance of the algorithm in terms
of scalability, complexity and structure of the solution.
Key words. Network Allocation Problem, Cloud storage, Evolutionary Game
Theory, Noisy Best Response, Systems on Graphs
AMS subject classification. 91A22, 91A43, 90C27
1 Introduction
In the last decade, game theory has emerged as a new fundamental paradigma in the
design and control of large scale networked engineering systems [2, 4, 6]. The basic
idea is that of modeling system units as rational agents whose behavior consists in
a selfish search for their maximum utility. The goal is to design both the agents
utility functions and an adaptation rule (evolutionary game dynamics) in such a
way that the resulting global behavior is desirable. One of the advantages of this
approach with respect to classical global optimization techniques is that it naturally
leads to scalable decentralized solutions that can easily incorporate constraints on
the computational power of the units as well as the information flow determined
by the network architecture. Consensus dynamics, which is a fundamental ingredi-
ent of networked control, has been recently recognized [5] to be an instance of an
evolutionary dynamics of a networked coordination game.
Two are the challenging issues when (evolutionary) game theory is used as a
mechanism design: first, designing admissible agent utility functions such that the
resulting game possesses desirable Nash equilibria; second, designing adaptation
rules that guarantee the solution’s convergence to such Nash equilibria. For an
important class of games known as potential games, a popular adaptation rule is
the so-called noisy best-response where units choose their state by following a Gibbs-
Boltzmann distribution having its peak on the maxima of the utility function [4].
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This rule can be proven to yield convergence, asymptotically in time and in the
limit of the noise approaching zero, to maxima of the potential that form a subclass
of the Nash equilibria. In this context, the goal is to design utility functions in
such a way that the potential (in particular, its maxima) have the desired global
properties. The noisy best-response turns out to be a random decentralized scheme
for the maximization of the potential.
In this paper, we consider an allocation problem where a population of units is
connected through a network and each of them possesses a number of items that
need to be allocated among the neighboring units. The interpretation is that of a
decentralized peer-to-peer cloud storage model where computers (or other devices
with storage capabilities) in a network are made to collaborate with each other so
that each of them can store a back up of their data in the available space of the
neighbors. The model was first presented in [1] where the reader can find more
detailed motivations.
We cast the allocation problem into a game theoretic framework by assuming
that each unit has a utility function that gives a value to their neighbors on the
basis of their reliability (possibly reflecting responsiveness or security issues), their
current congestion (resources have bounded storage capabilities), and the amount
of data the unit already stores in them. This reflects a number of features that we
want the storage final configuration to possess. In the storage process, a unit should
prefer to use those neighbors that are more reliable and, among equally reliable
ones, those that are less congested. Finally, storage should not be split into too
many parts to avoid excessive communication burden. Following evolutionary game
theory [4], we propose an algorithm based on a noisy best response action: each
time a unit activates, it decides which neighbor to use for storage on the basis of a
Gibbs probability distribution.
Allocation games have been extensively studied [8, 3]. One of the key features
of our model is the presence of hard constraints as a consequence of the bounded
storage capabilities of the units. This property is non-classical in game theory and
has remarkable consequences on the structure of Nash equilibria and the behavior
of the algorithm. The proposed game is shown to be a potential game. However,
convergence of the best response dynamics is here a subtle issue that does not
follow from classical results. This will follow instead from a careful proof of the
ergodicity of the underlying Markov process that constitutes the technical core of
this paper. The conclusive result is that: (i) all units complete their allocation
in finite time with probability one; and (ii) the allocation configuration converges,
when the noise parameter approaches 0, to a maximum of the potential. These
results were announced in [1], but not proven. Moreover, in this paper, we deal
with a more general situation: units can be in off mode and hence not responsive to
storage requests from neighbors.
In the remaining part of this section, we formally define the storage allocation
problem and recall some basic facts proven in [1] (in particular, a necessary and
sufficient condition for the allocation problem to be solvable). Section 2 is devoted
to cast the problem to a potential game theoretic framework [7] and to propose a
distributed algorithm that is an instance of a noisy best response dynamics. The
main technical part of the paper is Section 3 where the fundamental results Theorem
3 and Corollary 8 are stated and proven. Theorem 3 ensures that the algorithm
reaches a complete allocation with probability one, if a complete allocation is indeed
possible. Corollary 8 studies the asymptotic behavior of the algorithm and explicitly
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exhibits the invariant probability distribution. Consequence of Corollary 8 is that
in the double limit when time goes to infinity and the noise parameter goes to 0, the
algorithm converges to a Nash equilibrium that is, in particular, a global maximum
of the potential function. This guarantees that the solution will indeed be close to
the global welfare of the community. Finally, Section 4 is devoted to the presentation
of an extensive set of simulations that corroborate the theoretical results, prove the
good scalability properties of the algorithm in terms of speed and complexity, and
illustrate the effect of the parameters of the utility functions in the solution reached
by the algorithm. A conclusion section ends the paper.
1.1 The model
Consider a set X of units that play the double role of users who have to allocate
externally a back up of their data, as well resources where data from other units
can be allocated. Generically, an element of X will be called a unit, while the terms
user and resource will be used when the unit is considered in the two possible roles
of, respectively, a source or a recipient of data. We assume units to be connected
through a directed graph G = (X , E) where a link (x, y) ∈ E means that unit x is
allowed to store data in unit y. We denote by
Nx := {y ∈ X | (x, y) ∈ E}, N−y := {x ∈ X | (x, y) ∈ E}
respectively, the out- and the in-neighborhood of a node. Note the important dif-
ferent interpretation in our context: Nx represents the set of resources available to
unit x while N−y is the set of units having access to resource y. If D ⊆ X , we put
N(D) = ∪x∈DNx and N−(D) = ∪x∈DN−x .
We imagine the data possessed by the units to be quantized atoms of the same
size. Each unit x is characterized by two non negative integers:
• αx is the number of data atoms that unit x needs to back up into his neighbors,
• βx is the number of data atoms that unit x can accept and store from his
neighbors.
The numbers {αx} and {βx} will be assembled into two vectors denoted, respectively,
α and β. We also define
Ax = {(x, a) | a ∈ {1, . . . , αx}}, A =
⋃
x∈X
Ax
Given the triple (G, α, β), we define an allocation as any mapQ : A → X (Q(x, a) = y
means that x has allocated the data atom a into resource y) satisfying the properties
expressed below.
(C1) Graph constraint Q(x, a) ∈ Nx for all x ∈ X and a ∈ {1, . . . , αx};
(C2) Storage limitation For every y ∈ X , it holds, |Q−1(y)| ≤ βy.
We will say that the allocation problem is solvable if an allocation Q exists. We
denote by Q the set of allocations. We will also need to consider partial allocations,
namely functions Q : D → X where D ⊆ A and satisfying, where defined, conditions
(C1) and (C2). We denote by Qp the set of partial allocations.
The following result gives a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence
of allocations. The proof, which follows from Hall’s theorem, can be found in [1].
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Theorem 1. Given (G, α, β), there exists an allocation iff the following condition
is satisfied: ∑
x∈D
αx ≤
∑
y∈N(D)
βy ∀D ⊆ X (1)
In general, it is not necessary to check the validity of (1) for every subset D. We
say that D ⊆ X is maximal if for any D′ ) D, it holds N(D′) ) N(D). We say that
D1, D2 ⊆ X are independent if N(D1)∩N(D2) = ∅ and D ⊆ X is called irreducible
if it can not be decomposed into the union of two non empty independent subsets.
Clearly, it is sufficient to verify (1) for the subclass of maximal irreducible subsets.
Example 1. If G is complete, we have that N({x}) = X \ {x} while N(D) = X
for all D such that |D| ≥ 2. Hence, the only maximal irreducible subsets are the
singletons {x} and the set X . Condition (1) in this case reduces to
αx ≤
∑
y 6=x
βy, ∀x ∈ X
∑
x∈X
αx ≤
∑
y∈X
βy (2)
In general, the class of maximal irreducible subsets can be large and grow more
than linearly in the size of X , as the following example shows.
Example 2. If G = (X , E) is a line graph (X = {1, 2, . . . , n} and E = {(i, i+1), i =
1, . . . , n− 1}) it can be checked that the maximal irreducible subsets are those of the
form {i, i+ 2, . . . , i+ 2s}.
When the allocation problem is solvable, it will in general admit many possible
solutions. In order to analyze the set of solutions it is convenient to introduce an
aggregative function of allocations. Given a partial allocation Q, consider the matrix
W (Q) ∈ NX×X where W (Q)xy is the number of atomic data that x has allocated in
y under Q, namely,
W (Q)xy := |Q−1(y) ∩ Ax| (3)
Clearly W = W (Q) satisfies the following conditions
(P1) Wxy ≥ 0 for all x, y and Wxy = 0 whenever (x, y) 6∈ E .
(P2) Wx :=
∑
y∈X
Wxy ≤ αx for all x ∈ X .
(P3) W y :=
∑
x∈X
Wxy ≤ βy for all y ∈ X .
It is immediate to see that, conversely, if there exists W satisfying these properties
(such a W is called a partial allocation state), then, from it, we can construct an
allocation Q such that W = W (Q). Clearly, under this correspondence, we have
that Q ∈ Q iff W satisfies (P2) with equality for all x ∈ X . In this case W is called
an allocation state. The set of partial allocation states and the set of allocation
states are denoted, respectively, with the symbols Wp and W. It is clear that two
allocations Q1 and Q2 such that W (Q1) = W (Q2), only differ for a permutation of
the data atoms of the various units and for many purpouses can be considered as
equivalent. All the quantity of interest for the game theoretic setting will be defined
at the level of W .
Allocation states are in general not unique:
4
Example 3. Suppose G is the complete graph and that αx = α, βx = β for every
x ∈ X , with α ≤ β. Among the possible allocation states there are those where each
unit uses only one resource, namely for any permutation σ : X → X without fixed
points, we can consider
W σxy = α1σ(x)=y (4)
More generally, if s is an integer dividing α and we consider any symmetric s-
regular graph over X (without self-loops) with adjacency matrix A, we can consider
the corresponding state allocation WA given by
WAxy =
α
s
Axy (5)
It is immediate to check that this is indeed a state allocation and that, in particular,
(WA)y = α for every y.
In general, there are extra desired features that we may want solutions to possess:
• (Reliability) resources will often have different reliability properties and, in
the allocation, a preference to more reliable resources should be given;
• (Congestion) equally reliable resources should be equally used, avoiding con-
gestion phenomena;
• (Aggregation) units should use as few resources as possible to allocate their
data.
Notice how in the example above, all the allocations states considered yield equal
congestion for all resources while they differ from the point of view of aggregation:
the solutions W σ are of course the one maximizing this feature.
Instead of translating the above qualitative features into quantitative hard con-
straints on the allocation states, in this paper, we undertake a different road. We
cast the problem into a game theoretic scenario defining, for each unit x and for each
resource y, a function fxy(W ) that is the utility of x in using y under the current
(possibly partial) allocation state W . The utility functions are defined following
the so called ’mechanism design’ approach: utility will tend to be larger for more
reliable or less congest resources or for resources where the unit has already allo-
cated a larger size of its data. This will force the Nash equilibria of the game to be
allocation states possessing, at a certain degree, the above features (typically in a
compromised way depending on the parameter tuning of the utility functions). Our
algorithm builds upon this game theoretic set-up. It is based on evolutionary game
theory and is fully distributed: units iteratively allocate and move their data among
the neighbors on the basis of the space available and trying to maximize a utility
function that incorporates the features considered above. The algorithm always
leads to an allocation, when such an allocation exists, that is a Nash equilibrium of
the game.
2 The game theoretic set-up and the algorithm
In this section we present the details of the game theoretic structure and of the
allocation algorithm.
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Utilities are defined as follows. Under a (possibly partial) allocation state W ,
the utility of a unit x in using resource y is given by
fxy(W ) := λy − kcWy/βy + kaWxy (6)
The term λy encodes possible reliability differences among resources, the second term
is a congestion term that takes into consideration the level of use of the resource, and,
finally, the third term depends on both x and y and pushes a unit to allocate in those
resources where it has already allocated. kc, ka are two non-negative parameters to
tune the effect of the congestion and of the aggregation terms, respectively.
Given W ∈ Wp and x ∈ X , put
X x(W ) := {y ∈ Nx |Wy < βy}
the set of resources still available for x under the current allocation state W . An
allocation state W ∈ W (and also any Q ∈ Q such that W (Q) = W ) is called a
Nash equilibrium if, for every x ∈ X , for every y ∈ Nx such that Wxy > 0, for every
y′ ∈ X x(W ), it holds
fxy(W ) ≥ fxy′(W ′)
where W ′ = W − exy + exy′ . Under a Nash equilibrium, a unit whose goal is to
maximize its utility, has no advantage in moving their allocated data, under the
standing assumption that only one data atom at a time can be moved. Notice that
data atoms are to be interpreted as aggregations of data and the decision of their
size is part of the design of the algorithm. Clearly different levels of granularity will
give rise to different game models including different Nash equilibria.
Existence of Nash equilibria follow from the following considerations. Define
Ψ(W ) :=
∑
y∈X
Wy∑
s=0
[λy − kcs/βy] + ka
∑
x,y∈X
Wxy∑
s=0
s (7)
and notice that if W,W ′ ∈ W are such that W ′ = W − exy¯ + exy¯′ , then,
Ψ(W ′)−Ψ(W )
= (λy¯′ − kcW ′y¯′/βy¯′ + kaW ′x¯y¯′)− (λy¯ − kcWy¯/βy¯ + kaWx¯y¯)
= fxy¯′(W
′)− fxy¯(W )
(8)
In other terms, under the allocation state W , when user x moves a data atom from
y¯ to y¯′, he experiences a variation in utility given by Ψ(W ′)−Ψ(W ). Ψ is called a
potential of the game. Maxima of Ψ are clearly Nash equilibria while, in general,
the converse is not true. Considering that Ψ is defined on a finite set, a maximum,
and thus a Nash equilibrium, always exists. The existence of a potential will be also
fundamental in exploiting the properties of the allocation algorithm.
Remark (Relation with classical game theory): The game theoretic structure
we have just defined is apparently different from the classical one: a set of players,
each player playing an option and incurring in a utility that depends on the option
he plays as well from the options played by the rest of the population. What are
the players, the options and the utilities on our framework? One way to recast our
model into a classical game theoretic one is that of considering as set of players not
the set of units V, but the set of data atoms to be stored A. Given (x, a) ∈ A, its
set of options is simply given by Nx, the resources where it can be stored. A choice
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of an option for each player is equivalent to an allocation Q. The utility of a player
(x, a) under an allocation Q is given by fxy(W (Q)). The game so defined is clearly
potential with potential function given by Ψ.
A non-classical feature of our game is the presence of hard constraints (Wy ≤ βy)
in the way options can be simultaneously played. The presence of such constraints
have important consequences in the structure of Nash equilibria.
2.1 Examples
We now present a number of simple examples where Nash equilibria can be explicitly
exhibited. The simplest case is when ka = 0 since in this case the game becomes a
pure congestion game.
Example 4. Suppose G is the complete graph and that αx = α, βx = β, λx = λ for
every x ∈ X with α ≤ β. Suppose moreover that ka = 0. It is immediate to check
that any W such that W y = α for every resource y ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium. We
now check that these are all the possible ones. Indeed if W is a Nash equilibrium
such that W y > α > W y
′
for some y, y′ ∈ X , it follows that
fxy(W ) =
W y
β
<
W y
′
+ 1
β
= fxy′(W + exy′ − exy)
This yields Wxy = 0 for every x 6= y′. Therefore, Wy′y = W y > α that is a con-
tradiction. Among the Nash equilibria considered above, there are those introduced
in Example 3, W σ and WA. Since the potential Ψ depends on W only through the
values {W y}, it is easy to check that these Nash points are all maxima for Ψ.
In the case when G is not complete, the existence of state allocations W where
all resources are equally used (e.g.W y = α for all y) is not longer guaranteed.
From Theorem 1, a necessary and sufficient condition for this to happen is clearly
|D| ≤ |N(D)| for every D ⊆ X . Notice that when this condition is verified and
we consider the bipartite graph G˜ = (X × X , E˜) where (x, y) ∈ E˜ iff (x, y) ∈ E,
Hall’s theorem guarantees the existence of a matching in G˜ complete on the first set,
namely a permutation σ : X → X such that (x, σ(x)) ∈ E˜ for every x ∈ X . Using
σ, as in the complete case, we can construct the state allocation W σ where each
unit uses just one resource. Note that the condition |D| ≤ |N(D)| is automatically
verified in symmetric d-regular graphs. Indeed, if ED is the set of edges having one
of the nodes in D, we have that d|D| = |ED| ≥ d|N(D)|.
We now present an example where the condition |D| ≤ |N(D)| is violated.
Example 5. Let X = {0, 1, 2}2 and G to be the 2-grid over X , Suppose αx = α,
βx = β, λx = λ for every x ∈ X with α ≤ β. Suppose moreover that ka = 0.
Notice that |D| ≤ |N(D)| is not always verified. Indeed, if D = {(i, j) | 2|(i + j)}
we have that |D| = 5 while |N(D)| = 4. This implies that allocations where all the
resources are equally used can not exist. More precisely, it can not exist an allocation
if β < 5α/4. For β ≥ 5α/4 an allocation exists:
W(ij)(h,k) =

α
2 ifi, j ∈ {0, 2}
α
4 if (i, j) = (1, 1)
2α
5 if 2 6 |i+ j, h, k ∈ {0, 2}
α
5 if 2 6 |i+ j, (h, k) = (1, 1)
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This yields: W (i,j) = 4α/5 if (i, j) ∈ D while W (i,j) = 5α/4 if (i, j) ∈ X \D. It is
immediate to verify that the neighbors of each unit are resources equally congested:
this implies that W is a Nash equilibrium and, actually, for previous considerations,
it is easy to show that is indeed a maximum of Ψ.
The case when ka > 0 is generally harder to analyze. We start with a simple
remark. Suppose y1, y2 ∈ X are two resources with the same affidability and storage
capability β. Let W be a Nash equilibrium. If a unit x is using both resources under
W (e.g. Wxyi > 0 for i=1,2) and none of them is fully congested (e.g. W
yi < β for
i = 1, 2), then the fact that W is Nash implies the double inequality:
W y1 −W y2
β
+ ka − 1
β
≤ ka(Wxy1 −Wxy2) ≤
W y1 −W y2
β
− ka + 1
β
(9)
This implies that ka ≤ 1/β. Therefore, when ka > 1/β, in a Nash equilibrium,
a unit will never use more than one resource, unless all but one of them are fully
congested.
Example 6. Suppose G is the complete graph and that αx = α, βx = β, λx = λ for
every x ∈ X with α ≤ β. It is easy to show that the state allocations W defined in
(4) are maxima of the potential also for any ka > 0. In the case when ka ≤ 1/β,
it follows from (9) that also the state allocations WA proposed in (5) are still Nash
equilibria (no longer maxima though if ka > 0 and s > 1). Instead, in the case
ka > 1/β, it follows again from (9) that W
A is Nash only in the case β = α,
namely when resources are all fully congested. In the case ka > 1/β, moreover, new
Nash equilibria show up where resources have different congestion level. As a specific
example, for the case |X | = 3, the state allocation
W =
0 0 α0 0 α
α 0 0

is a Nash equilibrium for β ≥ 2α and ka ≥ 1/β.
Even when the graph is complete and ka = 0, the presence of resources with
different affidability and the presence of hard storage constraints, may cause the
presence of Nash equilibria where resources are not uniformly used. This is shown
in the following example.
Example 7. Suppose X = {1, 2, 3} and G is the complete graph (namely a 3-cycle).
Values of α, β are given by
α1 = 7 β1 = 35
α2 = 35 β2 = 21
α3 = 14 β3 = 28
Suppose moreover that
λ1 − 1 > λ2 = λ3 = 0
so that unit 1, as a resource, is always the best to use, even when it is fully congested.
Of course, in any Nash equilibrium W , resource 1 will be saturated, therefore W will
have the following structure
W =
 0 a 7− ab 0 35− b
35− b b− 21 0

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with a ∈ [0, 7]∩N and b ∈ [21, 35]∩N. Now notice that under a state like W above,
units 2 and 3 are automatically at equilibrium, they have no convenience to move
atoms. Let us analyze the utilities of unit 1. Defined W ′ = W + e13 − e12 and
W ′′ = W + e12 − e13, we have that
f12(W ) =
21−a−b
21 , f13(W
′) = a+b−4328
f13(W ) =
a+b−42
28 , f13(W
′′) = 20−a−b21
Algebraic computations show that
f12(W ) ≥ f13(W ′) ⇔ a+ b ≤ 30
f13(W ) ≥ f12(W ′′) ⇔ a+ b ≥ 30
We can thus conclude as follows: W is a Nash equilibrium if and only if the
parameters a and b are in the following three ranges:
(I) 21 ≤ b < 23 a = 7
(II) 23 ≤ b ≤ 30 a = 30− b
(III) 30 < b ≤ 35 a = 0
Notice that in case (II), we have that a + b = 30: in this case resources 2 and 3
are equivalent in the sense that there is no convenience in moving data from one
to the other and viceversa. Instead, in case (I) and (II), resources 2 and 3 give
unbalanced utilities. Straightforward computation shows that, Nash equilibria of type
II correspond to global maxima of the potential function ψ.
2.2 The algorithm
The allocation algorithm we are proposing is fully distributed and asynchronous and
is only based on communications between units taking place along the links of the
graph G = (X , E).
At every instant of time, a unit is either in functional state on or off: we interpret
off units, as units temporarily disconnected from the network, not available for
communication and any action including storage and data retrieval. A unit, which
is currently in state on, can activate and either allocate or move an atomic piece
or its data among the available resources (e.g. those neighbors that still have place
available and are on at that time). Choice of the available resource where to allocate
will be following a classical stochastic relaxation of the utility maximization based
on a Gibbs probability distribution: this is a classical choice in evolutionary game
theory and will be akin to a fairly complete theoretical analysis.
We now describe all the mathematical details of the algorithm. We recall that
a partial allocation is a function Q : D ⊆ A → X and that W = W (Q) denotes
the corresponding partial allocation state. The functional state of the network at a
certain time will instead be denoted by ξ ∈ {0, 1}X : ξx = 1 means that the unit x is
on. As already said, the basic ingredient of the algorithm is the Gibbs distribution
that we now formally introduce. Given a functional state ξ ∈ {0, 1}X , a partial
allocation state W ∈ Wp and a unit x ∈ X , we define
X x(ξ,W ) := {y ∈ Nx |Wy < βy, ξy = 1}
that is the set of neighbors of x that are on and have still space available. We then
denote with px(ξ,W ) the Gibbs probability distribution over X x(ξ,W ) given by
pxy(ξ,W ) =
eγfxy(W+exy)
Zxγ (ξ,W )
y ∈ X x(ξ,W )
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where γ > 0 is a parameter and where
Zxγ (ξ,W ) =
∑
y∈Xx(ξ,W )
eγfxy(W+exy)
is the normalizing factor.
The times when units modify their functional state (off to on or on to off)
and the times when they activate to allocate/distribute are modeled as a family of
independent Poisson clocks whose rates will be denoted (for unit x), respectively,
νonx , ν
off
x , and νactx . The functional state of the network as a function of time ξ(t) is
thus a continuous time Markov process whose components are independent Bernoulli
processes.
Mathematically, the algorithm can be described as a continuous-time process
Q(t) : D(t) → X taking values on the set of partial allocations Qp. We let W (t) =
W (Q(t)) denote the corresponding process of partial allocation states.
The details of the algorithm are described below.
1. Assume unit x¯ activates at time t. With probabilities
P allx¯ (W (t)), P
dis
x¯ (W (t)) = 1− P allx¯ (W (t))
the resource x¯ will make, respectively, an allocation or a distribution move as
explained below. Of course we are assuming that
P allx¯ (W (t)) = 0 if W (t)
x¯ = αx¯
P disx¯ (W (t)) = 0 if W (t)
x¯ = 0
2. (ALLOCATION MOVE)
• Choose (x¯, a¯) uniformly at random in (D(t))c ∩ Ax¯
• Choose y¯′ according to the Gibbs probability px¯y¯′(ξ(t),W (t))
• Put D(t+) = D(t) ∪ {(x¯, a¯)},
Q(t+)(x, a) =
{
y¯′ if (x, a) = (x¯, a¯)
Q(t)(x, a) if (x, a) ∈ D(t)
3. (DISTRIBUTION MOVE)
• Choose (x¯, a¯) uniformly at random in D(t) ∩ Ax¯ and put y¯ = Q(t)(x¯, a¯)
• Choose y¯′ according to the Gibbs probability px¯y¯′(ξ(t),W (t)− ex¯y¯)
• Put D(t+) = D(t),
Q(t+)(x, a) =
{
y¯′ if (x, a) = (x¯, a¯)
Q(t)(x, a) if (x, a) ∈ D(t) \ {(x¯, a¯)}
3 Analysis of the algorithm
In this section we analyze the behavior of the algorithm introduced above. We
will essentially show two results. First, we prove that if the set of allocation Q is
not empty (i.e. condition (1) is satisfied), the algorithm above will reach such an
allocation in bounded time with probability 1 (e.g D(t) = A for t sufficienty large).
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Second, we will show that, under a slightly stronger assumption than (1), in the
double limit t→ +∞ and then γ → +∞, the process Q(t) induced by the algorithm
will always converge, in law, to a Nash equilibrium that is a global maximum of the
potential function Ψ.
In order to prove such results, it will be necessary to go through a number of
intermediate technical steps. First of all, it will be convenient to work directly with
the process W (t) = W (Q(t)). By the fact that the jump probabilities of the original
process Q(t) are only function of W (t) and of ξ(t), it immediately follows that the
augmented process (ξ(t),W (t)) is Markovian and its only non zero transition rates
are described below:
Λ(ξ,W ),(ξ′,W ) =
{
νonx¯ if ξx¯ = 0, ξ
′¯
x = 1, ξx = ξ
′
x ∀x 6= x¯
νoffx¯ if ξx¯ = 1, ξ
′¯
x = 0, ξx = ξ
′
x ∀x 6= x¯
(10)
Λ(ξ,W ),(ξ,W ′) =

νactx¯ P
all
x¯ (W )p
x¯
y¯′(ξ,W )
if ξx¯ = ξy¯′ = 1, W
′ = W + ex¯y¯′
νactx¯ P
dis
x¯ (W )
Wx¯y¯
αx¯
px¯y¯′(ξ,W − ex¯y¯)
if ξx¯ = ξy¯ = ξy¯′ = 1, W
′ = W + ex¯y¯′ − ex¯y¯
(11)
We now introduce a graph on Wp that will be denoted by Lp: an edge (W,W ′)
is present in Lp if and only if Λ(1,W ),(1,W ′) > 0.
Our strategy will be to show that from any element W ∈ Wp there is a path
in Lp to some element W ′ ∈ W. Considering that there is a non-zero probability
that the process (ξ(t),W (t)) starting from (ξ,W ) will reach (1,W ) in bounded time
(because of the presence of transitions (10)), standard probabilistic arguments will
then allow to conclude that allocation (e.g. D(t) = A) will be achieved in bounded
time with probability 1.
Given W ∈ Wp we define the following subsets of units
X f (W ) := {x ∈ X |W x = αx},
X sat(W ) := {x ∈ X \ X f (W ) | 6 ∃y ∈ Nx s.t W (Q)y < βy}
Units in X f (W ) are called fully allocated: these units have completed the allocation
of their data under the state W . Units in X sat(W ) are called saturated: they have
not yet completed their allocation, however, under the current state W , they can
not make any action, neither allocate, nor distribute. Finally, define
Wsatp := {W ∈ Wp \W | X = X f (W ) ∪ X sat(W )}
It is clear that from any W ∈ Wp \ Wsatp , some allocation move can be performed.
Instead, if we are in a state W ∈ Wsatp , only possibly fully allocated units can
make a distribution move. Notice that, because of condition (1), for sure there
exist resources y such that Wy < βy and these resources are indeed exclusively
connected to fully allocated units. The key point is to show that in a finite number
of distribution moves it is always possible to move some data atoms from resources
connected to saturated units to resources with available space: this will then make
possible a further allocation move.
For any fixed W ∈ Wp, we can consider the following graph structure on X
thought as set of resources: HW = (X , EW ). Given y1, y2 ∈ X , there is an edge from
y1 to y2 if and only if there exists x ∈ X for which
Wxy1 > 0, (x, y2) ∈ E
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The edge from y1 to y2 will be indicated with the symbol y1 →x y2 (to also recall
the unit x involved). The presence of the edge means that the two resources y1 and
y2 are in the neighborhood of a common unit x that is using y1 under W . This
indicates that x can in principle move some of its data currently stored in y1 into
resource y2 if this last one is available. We have the following technical result
Lemma 2. Suppose (G, α, β) satisfies (1). Fix W ∈Wp and let y¯ ∈ X be such that
there exists x¯ ∈ Ny¯ with W x¯ < αx¯. Then, there exists a sequence
y¯ = y0, x0, y1, . . . , yt−1, xt−1, yt (12)
satisfying the following conditions
(Sa) Both families of the yk’s and of the xk’s are each made of distinct elements;
(Sb) yk →xk yk+1 for every k = 0, . . . , t− 1;
(Sc) Wyk = βyk for every k = 0, . . . , t− 1, and W (Q)yt < βyt.
Proof Let Y ⊆ X be the subset of nodes that can be reached from y¯ in HW .
Preliminarily, we prove that there exists y′ ∈ Y such that Wy′ < βy′ . Let
Z := {x ∈ X | ∃y ∈ Y, Wxy > 0}
and notice that, by the way Y and Z have been defined,
x ∈ Z, (x, y) ∈ E ⇒ y ∈ Y (13)
Suppose now that, contrarily to the thesis, Wy ≥ βy for all y ∈ Y. Then,∑
x∈Z
αx ≤
∑
y∈Y
βy =
∑
y∈Y
Wy =
∑
y∈Y
∑
x∈Z
Wxy =
∑
x∈Z
W x <
∑
x∈Z
αx (14)
where the first inequality follows from (13) and (1), the first equality from the
contradiction hypothesis, the second equality from the definition of Z, the third
equality again from (13) and, finally, last inequality from the existence of x¯. This is
clearly absurd and thus proves our claim.
Consider now a path of minimal length from y¯ to Y in HW :
y¯ = y0 →x0 y1 →x1 · · · →xt−2 yt−1 →xt−1 yt
and notice that the sequence y¯ = y0, x0, y1, . . . , yt−1, xt−1, yt will automatically
satisfy properties (Sa) to (Sc).
We are now ready to prove the first main result.
Theorem 3. Assume that
1. νonx > 0 and ν
act
x > 0 for every x ∈ X ,
2. P allx (W, x¯) > 0 if W
x < αx,
3. (G, α, β) satisfies (1).
Then,
P(∃t0 |W (t) ∈ W ∀t ≥ t0) = 1
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Proof In order to prove the claim, it will be sufficient to show that from any
W ∈ Wp there is a path in Lpto some element W ′ ∈ W. We will prove it by a
double induction process. To this aim we consider two indices associated to any
W ∈ Wp \W. The first one is defined by
mW =
∑
x∈X
(αx −W x) ≥ 1
To define the second, consider any x¯ ∈ X \ X f (W ). We can apply Lemma 2
to W and any y¯ ∈ Nx¯ and obtain that we can find a sequence of agents y¯ =
y0, x0, y1, . . . , yt−1, xt−1, yt satisfying the properties (Sa), (Sb), and (Sc) above.
Among all the possible choices of x¯ ∈ X , y¯ ∈ Nx¯ and of the corresponding sequence,
assume we have chosen the one minimizing t and denote such minimal t by tW . The
induction process will be performed with respect to the lexicographic order induced
by the pair (mW , tW ).
In the case when tW = 0, it means we can find x¯ ∈ X , y¯ ∈ Nx¯ such that
Wy¯ < βy¯. Therefore, under the allocation state W , the unit x¯ can allocate a further
data atom to y¯. Considering that the activation of the unit x¯ has positive probability
because of assumptions 1. and 2., this shows that W is connected to a W ′ such that
mW ′ < mW . In case mW = 1, this means that W
′ ∈ W.
Consider now any W ∈ Wp \ W such that t = tW > 1. Let x¯ ∈ X , y¯ ∈ Nx¯
and the sequence y¯ = y0, x0, y1, . . . , yt−1, xt−1, yt satisfying the properties (Sa),
(Sb), and (Sc) above. In the allocation state W , the unit xt−1, if activated (and
this again has positive probability to happen because of assumptions 1. and 2.),
can thus move an atomic piece of data from yt−1 to yt. The new allocation state is
W ′ = W−ext−1yt−1 +ext−1yt . Since W ′yt−1 < βyt−1 , for sure tW ′ < tW . The induction
argument is thus complete.
We are now left with studying the Markov process W (t) on W. Noisy Gibbs
best response dynamics are known to yields reversible Markov processes. This is
indeed the case also in our case once the process has reached the set of allocations
W. Precisely, the following result holds:
Proposition 4. (ξ(t),W (t)), restricted to {0, 1}X ×W, is a time reversible Markov
process. More precisely, for every (ξ,W ), (ξ′,W ′) ∈ {0, 1}X ×W it holds
ρ(ξ,W )Λ(ξ,W ),(ξ′,W ′) = ρ(ξ′,W ′)Λ(ξ′,W ′),(ξ,W ) (15)
where
ρ(ξ,W ) =
 ∏
x: ξx=1
νonx
∏
x: ξx=0
νoffx
 ∏x αx!∏
x,yWxy!
eγΨ(W ) (16)
Proof It follows from relations (10) and (11) that the only cases when Λ(ξ,W ),(ξ′,W ′)
and Λ(ξ′,W ′),(ξ,W ) are not both equal to zero are the following:
(i) W ′ = W , ξx¯ = 0, ξ ′¯x = 1, ξx = ξ′x ∀x 6= x¯
(ii) W ′ = W , ξx¯ = 1, ξ ′¯x = 0, ξx = ξ′x ∀x 6= x¯
(iii) ξ′ = ξ, W ′ = W + ex¯y¯′ − ex¯y¯.
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In case (i), we have that
ρ(ξ,W )
ρ(ξ′,W ′)
=
∏
x: ξx=1
νonx
∏
x: ξx=0
νoffx∏
x: ξ′x=1
νonx
∏
x: ξ′x=0
νoffx
=
νoffx¯
νonx¯
=
Λ(ξ′,W ′),(ξ,W )
Λ(ξ,W ),(ξ′,W ′)
Case (ii) can be analogously verified.
Consider now case (iii). We have that:
ρ(ξ,W )
ρ(ξ′,W ′)
=
W ′x¯y¯′
Wx¯y¯
eγ(Ψ(W )−Ψ(W
′)
On the other hand, using relation (11) and the fact that Z x¯γ (ξ,W ) = Z
x¯
γ (ξ
′,W ′), we
obtain
Λ(ξ′,W ′),(ξ,W )
Λ(ξ,W ),(ξ′,W ′)
=
W ′x¯y¯′
Wx¯y¯
eγ(fx¯y¯(W )−fx¯y¯′ (W
′))
We can now conclude using relation (8).
We now show that under a slight stronger assumption than (1), namely,∑
x∈A
αx <
∑
y∈N(A)
βy ∀A ⊆ X , (17)
the process (ξ(t),W (t)) restricted to {0, 1}X ×W is ergodic. Denote by L the graph
Lp restricted to the set W. Notice that, as a consequence of time-reversibility, L is
an undirected graph. Ergodicity is equivalent to proving that L is connected. We
start with a lemma analogous to previous Lemma 2.
Lemma 5. Suppose (G, α, β) satisfies (17) and let W ∈ W. Then, for every y¯ ∈ X ,
there exists a sequence (12) satisfying the conditions (Sa), (Sb), and (Sc) as in
Lemma 2.
Proof It is sufficient to follow the steps of to the proof of Lemma 2 noticing that
in (14) the first equality is now a strict inequality, while the last strict inequality
becomes an equality.
If W,W ′ ∈ W are connected through a path in L, we write that W ∼ W ′.
Introduce the following distance on W: if W 1,W 2 ∈ W
δ(W 1,W 2) =
∑
x,y
|W 1xy −W 2xy|
A pair (W 1,W 2) ∈ W is said to be minimal if
δ(W 1,W 2) ≤ δ(W 1′ ,W 2′) ∀W 1′ ∼W 1, ∀W 2′ ∼W 2
Notice that L is connected if and only if for any minimal pair (W 1,W 2), it holds
W 1 = W 2.
Lemma 6. Let (W 1,W 2) be a minimal pair. Suppose y ∈ X is such that W 1y < βy.
Then, W 1xy = W
2
xy for all x ∈ X .
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Proof Suppose by contradiction that W 1xy < W
2
xy for some x ∈ X . Then, necessar-
ily, there exists y′ 6= y such that W 1xy′ > W 2xy′ . Consider then W 1
′
= W 1−exy′+exy.
Clearly, δ(W 1
′
,W 2) < δ(W 1,W 2) and this contradicts the minimality assumption.
Thus W 1xy ≥ W 2xy for all x ∈ X . This yields W 2y < βy. Exchanging the role of W 1
and W 2 we obtain the thesis.
Proposition 7. If condition (17) holds true, the graph L is connected.
Proof Let (W 1,W 2) be any minimal pair. We will prove that W 1 and W 2
are necessarily identical. Consider any resource y. It follows from Lemma 5 that
we can find a sequence y = y0, x0, y1 · · · , yt−1, xt−1, yt satisfying the same (Sa),
(Sb), and (Sc) with respect to the state allocation W 1. Among all the possible
sequences, choose one with t minimal for given y. We will prove by induction on t
that W 1xy = W
2
xy for all x ∈ X .
If t = 0, it means that W 1y < βy. It then follows from Lemma 6 that W
1
xy =
W 2xy for all x ∈ X . Suppose now that the claim has been proven for all minimal
pairs (W 1,W 2) and any y ∈ X for which t < t¯ (w.r. to W 1) and assume that
y = y0, x0, y1 · · · , yt¯−1, xt¯−1, yt¯ satisfyies the properties (Sa), (Sb), and (Sc) with
respect to W 1. Notice that the unit xt¯−1 can move a data atom from resource yt¯−1
into resource yt¯ under the state allocation W
1 and obtain W 1
′
= W 1 − ext¯−1yt¯−1 +
ext¯−1yt¯ . Consider now W 2 and notice that Lemma 6 yields W 2xt¯−1yt¯ = W
1
xt¯−1yt¯ < βyt¯ .
Define
W 2
′
=
{
W 2 if W 2xt¯−1yt¯−1 = 0
W 2 − ext¯−1yt¯−1 + ext¯−1yt¯ if W 2xt¯−1yt¯−1 > 0
Clearly, δ(W 1
′
,W 2
′
) ≤ δ(W 1,W 2) and this implies that also W 1′ ,W 2′ is a minimal
pair. Notice that y = y0, x0, y1 · · · , yt¯−1 satisfies (Sa), (Sb), and (Sc) with respect
to W 1
′
. Therefore, by the induction hypotheses, it follows that W 1
′
xy = W
2′
xy for all
x ∈ X . Since W 1xy = W 1
′
xy and W
2
xy = W
2′
xy, result follows immediately.
Propositions 4 and 7 immediately yield the following final result.
Corollary 8. Suppose that (G, α, β) satisfies (17). Then (ξ(t),W (t)), restricted to
{0, 1}X ×W, is an ergodic time reversible Markov process whose unique invariant
probability measure is given by
µγ(ξ,W ) = Z
−1
γ
 ∏
x: ξx=1
νonx
∏
x: ξx=0
νoffx
( α
W
)
eγΨ(W )
where Zγ is the normalizing constant.
Remark: It follows from previous result that the process W (t) converges in law
to the probability distribution
µ˜γ(W ) := Z˜
−1
γ
(
α
W
)
eγΨ(W )
Notice that when γ → +∞, the probability µ˜γ converges to a probability concen-
trated on the set argmaxW∈W Ψ(W ) of state allocations maximizing the potential,
thus on particular Nash equilibria. Thus, if γ is small, the distribution of the process
W (t) for t sufficiently large will be close to a Nash equilibrium.
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Remark: Condition (17) is necessary for ergodicity. Notice indeed that in the
case when G is complete and αx = βx = a for all x ∈ X , under every allocation W
such that W y = a for every y, all resources will be saturated and, consequently, no
distribution move will be allowed in W . Such allocations W are thus all sinks in the
graph L that is therefore not connected.
4 Simulation
In this section, we present a number of numerical simulations that validate our
theoretical results and show the behavior of the proposed algorithm. We analyze
the structure of the asymptotic Nash configuration reached and the effect of the
variations of the parameters in the utility function. The algorithm is tested for its
convergence properties and evaluated through some performance indices measuring
the computational and topological complexity of the solution found.
Below we report the basic assumptions of our simulations.
• Most of our simulations will be for n = 10 or n = 50 units while larger
populations will be considered to show the scalability of the algorithm.
• We consider two possible underlying networks, a complete graph and a regular
graph with degree 10.
• We consider the case of homogeneous populations where all units have the
same αx, βx and λx, as well heterogeneous cases with two subpopulations X1
and X2 sharing different parameters.
• In the utility function we set the congestion parameter to be kc = 1 while we
consider different values for the aggregation parameter ka.
• Most of our simulations will assume that units are always on. An example
where units may be in off mode is however presented at the end.
• In the implementation of the algorithm, time is supposed to be discrete, as-
suming that at each instant of time a unit x wakes up with a probability
proportional to αx. The allocation and distribution moves are chosen follow-
ing the probabilities:
Pall(W (t), x) =
{
1 if W (t)x < αx
0 otherwise
, Pdis(W (t), x) = 1− Pall(W (t), x)
• The parameter γ in the Gibbs distribution is chosen to be time-varying with
the law:
γ(t) = γ(t− 1) + 1
λmax ∗ 100
where λmax is the maximum reliability of the resources.
• The typical time horizon we will consider in the algorithm will be T = 10∑x αx:
in this way every unit x will activate, on the average, a number of times equal
to 10 times the number of data atoms it needs to allocate. As we will see,
this time range is in general sufficient to reach, or at least get close, to a Nash
equilibrium. Greater time ranges will be considered in some cases.
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For all examples, the performance of the algorithm will be analyzed considering
the following parameters computed, in a Montecarlo style, by averaging over 10
running of the algorithm.
• Distance from optimum: ψ = Ψ(WT )Ψopt where Ψopt is the maximum of the
potential. This allows to measure how the final allocation state W (T ) is far
from a Nash configuration maximizing the potential Ψ. We will use the exact
value of Ψopt in the homogeneous cases treated in Examples 4 and 6 for which
the optimum Nash is explicitly known. For the heterogeneous cases we will
instead approximate it using standard Matlab numerical algorithm.
In some cases we will also present a plot of the function ψ(t) = Ψ(W (t))Ψopt in this
case for a single running of the algorithm.
• Allocation complexity: the parameter
νmoves =
1
n
∑
x∈X
mx
αx
where mx is the total number of moves (allocation and distribution) made by
unit x. νmoves measures the number of allocation and distribution moves per
piece of data. Since moving data from a resource to another can be expensive,
it is an important parameter to control.
• Average satisfaction:
Λ¯ :=
1
n
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Nx
W Txy
αx
λy
This is meaningful when there are resources with different values for λy. If
we interpret λy as a measure of the quality of a resource y (reflecting possible
different features as responsiveness, security, etc), Λ¯ measures the efficiency of
the algorithm to choose the best resources where to allocate.
• Topological complexity: We consider the subgraph constituted by the edges
(x, y) such that W Txy > 0 and we compute the average out-degree and average
in-degree for the two subpopulations in the heterogeneous case
d+ :=
1
n
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈X
1{WTxy>0}, d
−
i :=
2
n
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Xi
1{WTxy>0}, i = 1, 2
d+ measures the way units have split their data among the available neighbors,
while d−i the average amount of units using a resource of a certain type.
• Average congestion: For the heterogeneous case, the following index mea-
sure the congestion of the two classes of resources:
C¯i :=
1
nβ
∑
y∈Xi
W Ty
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4.1 Homogeneous case
In this section we consider the case when all units have equal parameters: αx = α,
βx = β and λx = λ for every x ∈ X . In this case Nash equilibria were studied in
Examples 4 and 6. In particular, we know that, for any value of the aggregation pa-
rameter ka, the maximum of the potential is given by the Nash equilibria where each
unit uses just one resource: W σxy = α1σ(x)=y where σ : X → X is any permutation
without fixed points.
Example 8. Assume that n = 10 and that the underlying graph is complete. Pa-
rameters are set to the values: α = 27, β = 30, and λ = 3. We consider the
following values for the aggregation term ka: 0, 0.003, 0.1. Notice that only case
when ka > 1/β is for ka = 0.1: in this case we expect to find final state allocation
where the aggregation feature prevails according to the considerations in Example 6.
For all simulations we compute the indices ψ, νmoves and d
+. Here are the values
we have obtained:
ka = 0 ka = 0.003 ka = 0.1
νmoves 8.7863 6.2907 3.5359
d+ 7.4100 1 1
ψ 0.9994 1 1
Table 1: Values for ka = 0, ka = 0.003, ka = 0.1 in the complete case
Notice how the number of moves per atom is decreasing with ka: this feature
is due to the fact that the stronger is the aggregation term, the more the initial
allocation will tend to immediately create a solution with aggregation features already
close to a Nash equilibrium.
Notice how for ka = 0 the optimal is in general not reached, while it is reached
in the case ka = 0.003 and ka = 0.1. In order to better understand the convergence
behavior, below we present, for a single running of the algorithm, the plot of ψ(t):
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Figure 1: Plot of ψ(t) for ka = 0, ka = 0.003, ka = 0.1
Notice how, in the case ka = 0, the convergence is indeed fast in the initial part
but then it slows down and the dynamics remains for a long time fluctuating in ma-
trices close to a Nash. A typical running of the algorithm yields a final configuration
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W (T ) of type
W (T ) =

0 4 2 2 1 1 5 8 2 2
4 0 8 3 3 2 4 1 1 1
3 2 0 2 4 1 1 5 4 5
1 5 5 0 1 0 0 10 3 2
6 0 3 1 0 5 3 2 4 3
2 1 2 1 2 0 6 0 7 6
3 4 0 5 7 3 0 1 1 3
2 5 2 4 4 1 3 0 2 4
3 5 4 2 2 4 1 3 0 3
5 0 3 6 3 5 3 0 2 0

with congestion vector C = 1∗W (T ) = (29 26 29 26 27 22 26 30 26 29)
In this case, in order to achieve the optimum with all resources equally congested, the
algorithm must run for much longer time, order of 200∗∑x αx. This is a peculiarity
of the case without aggregation term and such phenomena never shows up otherwise.
A faster convergence however can be obtained in this case by a different tuning of
the noise function. Using
γ(t) = γ(t− 1) + 1
λmax ∗ 10
we typically reach an optimum at T = 30 ∗∑x αx.
In the case when ka = 0.003 or ka = 0.1 convergence is slower in the initial part,
however, the typical state allocation W (T ) constructed by the algorithm will instead
be a matrix of type W σ, namely an optimal Nash equilibrium.
The aim of the following example is to prove that the different non-optimal Nash
equilibria presented in Example 6 can attract the dynamics of the algorithm.
Example 9. Assume that n = 10 and that the underlying graph is complete. Pa-
rameters are set to the values: α = 27, β = 60 (so that β > 2α), λ = 3, and
ka = 0.1 > 1/β. The time horizon is fixed to T = 20 ∗
∑
x αx. Here are the values
of ψ, νmoves and d
+ obtained in this case:
νmoves 3.2781
d+ = d− 1
ψ 0.9805
Table 2: Values for β > 2α
Notice how the optimal Nash (e.g. any aggregated matrix W σ) is not reached in
general. If we analyze single runnings of the algorithm, we can verify that the algo-
rithm reach different possible Nash equilibria: besides the optimal W σ, we observe
also final configurations where one or more resources are used by two units. Here is
a sample of final configurations observed
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W =

0 0 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 27 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27
27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 0 0
0 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 0
0 0 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 27 0 0 0

Notice how such Nash equilibria where indeed correctly forecasted in Example 6.
We conclude the homogeneous case with an example showing the good scalability
properties of the algorithm.
Example 10. We consider the case when n = 50, 100, 1000 and that the underlying
graph is a random regular graph with degree 10 (the use of the complete graph for
large number of units becomes heavy on the computational side and, in any case, is
also of little practical interest). Parameters are set to the values: α = 27, β = 30,
λ = 3, ka = 0.03. Here are the values obtained for ψ, νmoves and d
+:
n = 50 n = 100 n = 1000
νmoves 2.6876 2.7064 1.4592
d+ = d− 1 1.0870 1.1000
ψ 1 0.9978 0.9973
Table 3: Scalability of the Algorithm
4.2 Non-homogeneus case
In this section we consider the case when all units have the same αx = α and βx = β
but, for what the reliability is concerned, the population is split into two parts X1
and X2 and λx = λi if x ∈ Xi with λ1 6= λ2. While we do not have in this case any
explicit computation of the optimal Nash equilibrium, it can easily been shown that
the aggregate solution W σ is a Nash Equilibrium (possibly not a maximum of the
potential) if and only if ka ≥ λ
2−λ1−1/β
α−1 .
Example 11. Assume that n = 50, |X1| = |X2| = 25, and that the underlying graph
is either complete or random regular of degree 10. Parameters are set to the values:
α = 45, β = 50, λ1 = 0.5 λ2 = 0.8. We consider different values for the aggregation
term ka. For all simulations we compute the parameters ψ, νmoves, d
+, d−, Λ¯, and
C¯i averaged over 10 running of the algorithm. Here are the values we have obtained
in the two cases of a complete graph and of a random regular graph of degree 10.
These results, on one hand, show how the speed and computational performance
of the algorithm in these heterogeneous cases are similar to the homogeneous case:
at the horizon time T the system is always very close to (or is exactly at) the optimal
solution and the number of moves per atom is similar. On the other hand, other
interesting features emerge from an analysis of the other parameters. The congestion
parameters show how, for very small aggregation term ka = 0.001, the most reliable
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ka = 0.001 ka = 0.005 ka = 0.1
νmoves 4.7015 4.8150 3.2110
Λ¯ 0.6667 0.6593 0.6502
C¯1 0.8000 0.8439 0.9000
C¯2 1.0000 0.9561 0.9000
d+ 21.1180 2.1680 1
d−1 13.5440 1.0920 1
d−2 28.6920 3.2440 1
ψ 0.9998 1 1
Table 4: Complete case
ka = 0.001 ka = 0.005 ka = 0.1
νmoves 4.1580 4.5907 2.5242
Λ¯ 0.6667 0.6595 0.6511
C¯1 0.8000 0.8430 0.8933
C¯2 1.0000 0.9570 0.9067
d+ 6.3160 1.7000 1.0680
d−1 2.8720 1.0480 1.0240
d−2 9.7600 2.3520 1.1120
ψ 0.9998 0.9999 0.9986
Table 5: Regular case
resources in X2 are fully used, while for ka = 0.1 resources in X1 and X2 are almost
equally congested. Indeed in this last case, at least when the graph is complete, the
aggregated solutions W σ are optimal and they are indeed reached by the algorithm.
Notice that the average degrees are already very small at the intermediate level ka =
0.005: in this case the solution found by the algorithm is close to one where each
unit uses just one resource. Clearly, the tuning of the parameters (in particular,
the aggregation term ka) will be important in real world applications: it will allow,
depending on the specific needs of the working case, to trade-off reliability of the
mostly used resources versus aggregation. Finally, notice how the fact of working
with a preassigned topology does not change very much the behavior of the algorithm.
We conclude this section with an example where we also incorporate the feature
that resources may be on or off. In our discrete time model we assume that every time
each unit x is on with probability px (independently from the others). Specifically,
we assume that X is split into two subfamilies X1 and X2 such that λx = λi and
px = p
i if x ∈ Xi. Moreover, we assume that λi = mpi for i = 1, 2 and some
proportionality constant m. This makes sense: the reliability is assumed to be
proportional to the probability of finding the resource in on state.
Example 12. Assume that n = 50, |X1| = |X2| = 25, and that the underlying graph
is complete. Parameters are set to the values: α = 45, β = 50, p1 = 0.5, p2 = 0.8,
m = 5, ka = 0, 1. Here, we fix the time horizon T = 50 ∗
∑
x αx.
We compute the parameters ψ, νmoves, d
+, d−, Λ¯, and C¯i averaged over 10
running of the algorithm.
νmoves 3.1080
Λ¯ 0.6620
C¯1 0.8278
C¯2 0.9722
d+ 1.4860
d−1 0.9320
d−2 2.0400
ψ 0.9484
Table 6: Values considering on and off resources
As shown in the table, even if the time horizon is higher than in previous examples,
the average number of moves per each atom is of similar order due to the fact that
when units are in off mode they can neither allocate or accept allocation. For the rest,
the other parameters show that the algorithm, though more slowly, has a behavior
similar to the case when units are always on.
21
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed an allocation algorithm that allows a network of
units (computers) to use the memory space available in their neighbors to store
a back up of their data. The interest for such an algorithm comes from the goal
of creating a peer-to-peer decentralized cloud storage model to be thought as an
alternative to classical centralized cloud storage services.
The proposed algorithm is based on evolutionary game theory. The main theo-
retical contribution has been to prove convergence and to give en efficient charac-
terization of the asymptotic in terms of an explicit invariant probability distribution
picked on optimal Nash equilibria. We have also carried on a number of simulations
showing the good scalability properties of the algorithm, its reduced complexity and
illustrating the nice features of the final allocation state.
A number of important issues remain open and are left for future research.
Among these: (i) find explicit bounds on the convergence time of the algorithm;
(ii) study the structure of the Nash equilibria for general topologies; (iii) extend
to the case when multiple back up copies are needed to be stored with the further
security constraint of using different resources for the different copies.
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